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411 
Are Intellectually Disabled Individuals Still at Risk of 
Capital Punishment After Hall v. Florida? The Need for a 
Totality-of-the-Evidence Test to Protect Human Rights in 
Determining Intellectual Disability 
I. Introduction 
Capital punishment of the intellectually disabled draws international 
attention as a human rights issue.1 The U.N. Commission on Human Rights 
encouraged nations “neither to impose the death penalty on, nor execute, ‘a 
person suffering from any form of mental disorder.’”2 This Note focuses on 
capital punishment of the intellectually disabled in the United States in light 
of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Hall v. Florida.3  
The Court has not set forth bright-line rules for defining and evaluating 
intellectual disability, leaving individual states to adopt their own 
procedures and “introducing variability into an already challenging area of 
law.”4 In Hall, the Court provided some guidance for states and more 
protection for intellectually disabled defendants in capital cases by striking 
down a Florida law that required a fixed intelligence quotient (IQ) test score 
of seventy or below before a defendant could present additional evidence of 
intellectual disability.5 While the Hall ruling marked significant progress 
for the rights of the intellectually disabled, the Court did not go far enough: 
it should have established a comprehensive test requiring courts to consider 
all of a defendant’s evidence of an intellectual disability when determining 
whether a defendant qualifies to proceed with an intellectual-disability 
defense.  
II. Law Before the Case 
The Eighth Amendment bans the infliction of cruel and unusual 
punishment.6 The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, the common term 
for this portion of the Eighth Amendment, has been incorporated to the 
                                                                                                                 
 1. James Welsh, Medicine, Mental Health, and Capital Punishment, in MENTAL 
HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS: VISION, PRAXIS, AND COURAGE 264, 274 (Michael Dudley, 
Derrick Silove & Fran Gale eds., 2012). 
 2. Id. at 266. 
 3. 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014). 
 4. Welsh, supra note 1, at 274. 
 5. 134 S. Ct. at 1990. 
 6. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
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states via the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.7 Because the 
Supreme Court has not precisely defined what constitutes cruel and 
unusual, states face the challenge of determining which forms of state-
sanctioned punishment fall under that umbrella. One area the Court has 
addressed, however, is how “cruel and unusual” applies to intellectual 
disability.8  
The landmark case expanding Eighth Amendment protection for 
intellectually disabled9 defendants in capital cases is Atkins v. Virginia.10 
The Atkins Court held that capital punishment of the intellectually disabled 
violates the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment.11 
In Atkins, the petitioner received the death penalty for abducting, robbing, 
and then shooting a man.12 The petitioner had an IQ of fifty-nine, and a 
psychological expert declared him intellectually disabled.13 On appeal, the 
petitioner claimed he could not receive the death penalty because of his 
mental disability.14 
The Atkins Court examined the policy reasons behind banning capital 
punishment of the intellectually disabled.15 Most importantly, the Court 
recognized that criminals with intellectual disabilities lack the same level of 
culpability characteristic of criminal conduct that warrants capital 
punishment.16 States' concern for protecting the intellectually disabled also 
influenced the Atkins decision.17 The Court acknowledged the trend among 
states to abolish capital punishment for the intellectually disabled, even 
though states prioritized anticrime legislation.18 Furthermore, the Court 
noted that executing the intellectually disabled does not serve the objectives 
of deterrence or retribution, the two common justifications for the death 
                                                                                                                 
 7. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., 532 U.S. 424, 433-34 (2001) (citing 
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam)); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 
660, 667 (1962). 
 8. E.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).   
 9. The Atkins Court used the term “mentally retarded” to refer to the same status as 
intellectually disabled. Because “mentally retarded” has been replaced with “intellectually 
disabled,” Rosa’s Law, Pub. L. No. 111-256, 124 Stat. 2644 (2010), this Note uses 
“intellectually disabled” throughout. 
 10. 536 U.S. 304. 
 11. Id. at 321. 
 12. Id. at 307. 
 13. Id. at 308-09. 
 14. Id. at 310. 
 15. Id. at 306-07.  
 16. Id. at 306.   
 17. Id. at 315-16.  
 18. Id. 
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penalty.19 Finally, the Court expressed concern that an intellectually 
disabled defendant lacks the capacity to assist in, and may even undermine, 
her own defense.20 Due to such unique concerns associated with 
intellectually disabled defendants, the Court concluded that execution of the 
intellectually disabled constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.21  
Although the Atkins Court declared the intellectually disabled ineligible 
for the death penalty, it did not answer the question presented in Hall: how 
should courts determine who qualifies as intellectually disabled?22 The 
Court neither articulated a standard definition for intellectual disability nor 
established a test for determining whether a defendant has a deficient 
intellectual capacity.23 Without these guidelines, a court is unable to 
determine whether an individual lacks sufficient intellectual competence for 
the purposes of death-penalty eligibility. Because there is no uniform test, 
states have discretion in implementing the ban on capital punishment of the 
intellectually disabled.24 Ultimately, states exercise this discretion with little 
guidance from the Supreme Court.25 
The Atkins Court relied on the clinical definitions of intellectual 
disability crafted by the American Association on Intellectual and 
Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD) and the American Psychiatric 
Association (APA).26 The APA released the newest edition of the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) in 2013 
(the year before the Hall decision), which provides the modern, medically 
accepted definition of intellectual disability.27 Intellectual disability is 
defined as “a disorder with onset during the developmental period that 
includes both intellectual and adaptive functioning deficits in conceptual, 
social, and practical domains.”28 To be considered intellectually disabled, 
                                                                                                                 
 19. Id. at 318-19. 
 20. Id. at 320-21. 
 21. Id. at 321. 
 22. Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1993 (2014).  
 23. Penny J. White, Treated Differently in Life but Not in Death: The Execution of the 
Intellectually Disabled After Atkins v. Virginia, 76 TENN. L. REV. 685, 685 (2009). 
 24. Kathryn Raffensperger, Comment, Atkins v. Virginia: The Need for Consistent 
Substantive and Procedural Application of the Ban on Executing the Intellectually Disabled, 
90 DENV. U. L. REV. 739, 740-41, 743 (2012). 
 25. Id.  
 26. Jeffrey Usman, Capital Punishment, Cultural Competency, and Litigating 
Intellectual Disability, 42 U. MEM. L. REV. 855, 874 (2012). 
 27. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS 33 (5th ed. 2013). 
 28. Id. 
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an individual must satisfy three requirements: (1) deficits in intellectual 
functioning, as confirmed by clinical and standardized testing; (2) deficits 
in adaptive functioning, manifested by activities of independent living; and 
(3) onset of these deficits during the developmental period of life.29 
States have used these clinical definitions in drafting rules to determine 
intellectual disability in capital cases.30 The Florida statute at issue in Hall 
utilizes the common clinical definitions for intellectual disability: 
significantly subaverage intellectual functioning along with deficits in 
adaptive functioning manifested by age eighteen.31 Despite compliance with 
clinical standards, Florida’s definition of subaverage intellectual 
functioning sparked controversy. The relevant language of the statute states: 
The term “significantly subaverage general intellectual 
functioning,” for the purpose of this section, means performance 
that is two or more standard deviations from the mean score on a 
standardized intelligence test specified in the rules of the Agency 
for Persons with Disabilities.32  
In addressing intellectual deficiency, the statute does not expressly 
require or reject the inclusion of the standard error of measurement (SEM). 
The SEM refers to the margin of error or imprecision in a given IQ test, 
usually a five-point range.33 Because of the statute’s silence on the SEM, 
the Florida Supreme Court in Cherry v. State interpreted the statute to 
require a strict IQ cutoff of seventy, or two standard deviations below the 
mean score of 100.34 The court held that Cherry was not intellectually 
disabled for the purposes of capital punishment because his IQ score of 
seventy-two was above the seventy-point cutoff.35 If the margin of error had 
been taken into account, Cherry would have qualified as intellectually 
disabled because a five-point difference would have put his IQ at sixty-
seven, which is below the seventy-point cutoff. The dispute in Hall 
centered on the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of the statute rather 
than the statute’s express language.36  
                                                                                                                 
 29. Id. 
 30. Usman, supra note 26, at 877-78. 
 31. FLA. STAT. § 921.137(1) (2013). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1995 (2014); AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 
27, at 37. 
 34. 959 So. 2d 702, 712-13 (Fla. 2007) (per curiam), overruled by Hall, 134 S. Ct. 1986. 
 35. Id. at 714. 
 36. See 134 S. Ct. at 1994. 
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III. Statement of the Case 
A. Facts 
Freddie Hall was convicted and sentenced to death in Florida for 
murdering a twenty-one-year-old pregnant woman and a sheriff’s deputy.37 
To support Hall’s defense that he could not receive the death penalty due to 
his intellectual disability, he provided evidence from his former teachers, an 
attorney in a previous matter, and his attorney for the present murder case 
showing that he was mentally delayed and unable to assist in defending his 
case.38 Hall’s siblings also testified that he had suffered extreme child abuse 
at the hands of his mother due to his intellectual disability.39 
Notwithstanding this evidence, the jury voted to give Hall the death 
penalty, and the sentencing court adopted the jury’s decision.40  
The Supreme Court of Florida upheld the sentence because Hall failed to 
present evidence of an IQ score of seventy or below, as required to proceed 
with an intellectual-disability defense in Florida.41 Hall presented nine IQ 
scores ranging from a score of sixty to a score of eighty, but the court 
refused to allow all of them to be submitted into evidence for unexplained 
evidentiary reasons.42 Only scores above seventy were considered.43 The 
Florida Supreme Court interpreted the statute to bar a defendant from 
introducing additional evidence of an intellectual disability without first 
providing an IQ test score of seventy or below.44 Thus, the court upheld the 
seventy-point threshold.45  
B. Issue 
The issue on appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court was whether the Florida 
statute requiring a defendant to produce a fixed IQ test score of seventy or 
below before pursuing an intellectual-disability defense in a capital case 
was constitutional under the Eighth Amendment.46 The case turned on how 
                                                                                                                 
 37. Id. at 1990. 
 38. Id. at 1990-91. 
 39. Id. at 1991. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 1992. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 1994. 
 45. Id. at 1992. 
 46. Id. at 1994. 
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to define intellectual disability and how to determine whether a criminal 
defendant was intellectually disabled in the wake of Atkins.47 
C. Holding 
The U.S. Supreme Court considered current medical practices in 
attempting to define and establish a test for determining intellectual 
disability.48 Because the Florida Supreme Court did not account for the 
SEM in IQ testing or allow Hall to introduce other evidence relevant to 
intellectual ability, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Hall lacked a 
sufficient opportunity to prove his intellectual disability.49 
In a five-to-four decision, the Court held that Florida’s statute was 
unconstitutional.50 Hall’s central holding is recognized to be: “[W]hen a 
defendant’s IQ test score falls within the test’s acknowledged and inherent 
margin of error, the defendant must be able to present additional evidence 
of intellectual disability, including testimony regarding adaptive deficits.”51 
Because the Florida statute allowed capital punishment of defendants 
claiming intellectual disability solely based on an IQ test score—without 
accounting for the test’s margin of error or considering other evidence—the 
statute violated the constitutional ban on cruel and unusual punishment.52 
The Court reversed and remanded the Florida Supreme Court’s decision.53  
Current literature discussing Hall focuses on the potential implications of 
the Court’s use of a consensus among the states as a basis for regulating 
criminal procedure.54 The Court noted that Hall would not be automatically 
eligible for capital punishment in forty-one states because they did not 
impose a strict IQ cutoff score.55 While this Note briefly addresses the 
relevance of such a trend in the context of modern views on human 
                                                                                                                 
 47. Id. at 1993. 
 48. The Court “define[d] intellectual disability according to three criteria: significantly 
subaverage intellectual functioning, deficits in adaptive functioning . . . and onset of these 
deficits during the developmental period.” Id. at 1994. 
 49. Id. at 2000-01. 
 50. Id. at 1990. 
 51. Id. at 2001; see also Bidish J. Sarma, How Hall v. Florida Transforms the Supreme 
Court’s Eighth Amendment Evolving Standards of Decency Analysis, 62 UCLA L. REV. 
DISCOURSE 186, 190 (2014), http://www.uclalawreview.org/pdf/discourse/62-10.pdf; Leading 
Case, Hall v. Florida, 128 HARV. L. REV. 271, 274-75 (2014). 
 52. Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 2001.  
 53. Id. 
 54. Sarma, supra note 51, at 188; Leading Case, supra note 51, at 276. 
 55. Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1997. 
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dignity,56 the major focus of this Note is the need for an appropriate, 
uniform test to determine whether a capital defendant claiming an 
intellectual disability is, in fact, intellectually disabled.  
IV. Analysis 
Rather than requiring a certain IQ test score, even accounting for the 
SEM, courts should employ a totality-of-the-evidence test to determine 
whether a defendant in a capital case is intellectually disabled. This test 
would allow a defendant to present all of his evidence showing an 
intellectual disability without first providing a certain IQ test score. For 
example, the defendant could produce eyewitnesses, expert testimony, 
academic evidence, and any other admissible form of evidence, and a court 
would then determine intellectual ability after reviewing all of the evidence 
together.  
A low IQ test score is, of course, strong evidence of an intellectual 
disability, but it should not be the sole determining factor of a person’s 
intellectual ability—or lack thereof—when a person’s life hangs in the 
balance. The “DSM-5 emphasizes the need to use both clinical assessment 
and standardized testing of intelligence when diagnosing intellectual 
disability, with the severity of impairment based on adaptive functioning 
rather than IQ test scores alone.”57 The totality-of-the-evidence test is 
proper because it provides greater protection for human rights, allows for 
the consideration of other important factors that indicate intellectual 
disability, and upholds principles of federalism. 
A. The Totality-of-the-Evidence Test Protects Human Rights 
Over time, American society’s view of the intellectually disabled has 
drastically changed from disdain to understanding. In the early twentieth 
century, intellectually disabled individuals were feared and even presumed 
to be criminals.58 While the public denigration of the intellectually disabled 
lasted until the 1950s, intellectually disabled defendants received little to no 
protection in criminal proceedings well into the late 1980s.59 The plight of 
intellectually disabled defendants improved by the 1990s when several 
                                                                                                                 
 56. See infra Section IV.A.I and note 62. 
 57. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5 INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY FACT SHEET 1 (2013), 
http://www.dsm5.org/documents/intellectual%20disability%20fact%20sheet.pdf. 
 58. Usman, supra note 26, at 865. 
 59. Id. at 869-71. 
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states enacted legislation to prevent these individuals from receiving the 
death penalty.60  
The United States, however, lagged behind international standards for 
human rights with respect to the intellectually disabled. As early as 1999, 
the U.N. Commission on Human Rights called for all nations that impose 
the death penalty to refrain from executing any person with a mental 
disorder.61  
By exempting the intellectually disabled from capital punishment in 
Atkins and barring automatic eligibility for the death penalty based on a 
strict IQ threshold in Hall, the U.S. Supreme Court finally focused on 
protecting the human rights of the intellectually disabled. The totality-of-
the-evidence test advances the human rights policies in Atkins and Hall 
because it promotes the inherent dignity of all persons and comports with 
the deterrent and retributive justifications for capital punishment. 
1. The Test Promotes the Inherent Dignity of All Persons 
Requiring states to employ the totality-of-the-evidence test to determine 
whether a defendant in a capital case is intellectually disabled prioritizes 
protection of the dignity of intellectually disabled defendants. Among other 
objectives, “[T]he Eighth Amendment reaffirms the duty of the government 
to respect the dignity of all persons.”62 Respect for human dignity can 
hardly be accomplished when a court refuses to give a defendant a full and 
fair opportunity to present evidence of her disability. Furthermore, the reach 
of the Eighth Amendment is determined by “evolving standards of decency 
that mark the progress of a maturing society.”63  
By the time the Court decided Atkins, a national trend had emerged in 
favor of protecting the intellectually disabled from capital punishment, and 
American society considered intellectually disabled lawbreakers to be “less 
culpable than the average criminal.”64 Furthermore, the Hall Court 
emphasized that the states’ rejection of strict IQ cutoffs showed that such 
limited protection for the intellectually disabled failed to comport with 
American society’s idea of what is “proper or humane.”65 
                                                                                                                 
 60. Id. at 872. 
 61. Economic and Social Council Res. 1999/61, ¶ 3(e) (Apr. 28, 1999). 
 62. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2004). 
 63. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 
101 (1958)). 
 64. Id. at 316. 
 65. Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1998 (2014). 
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The totality-of-the-evidence test reduces the likelihood of a defendant 
being sentenced to death when he lacks the requisite culpability. Because 
the test would allow a capital defendant every opportunity to present any 
evidence relevant to an intellectual-disability defense—regardless of an IQ 
score—the test operates in the defendant’s favor. The totality-of-the-
evidence test would err on the side of caution in capital cases by making it 
easier for a defendant to admit evidence of an intellectual disability and 
rendering an intellectually disabled defendant less likely to be executed. 
Current Eighth Amendment jurisprudence66 and modern standards of 
humanity67 demand a test for determining intellectual disability that 
prevents an intellectually disabled defendant from slipping through the 
cracks of the justice system and receiving the death penalty. 
2. The Test Comports with the Deterrent and Retributivist Justifications 
for Capital Punishment 
Proportionality is the touchstone of just punishment in the Eighth 
Amendment context.68 Punishment that is disproportionate to the crime is 
excessive and barred under the Eighth Amendment.69 The U.S. Supreme 
Court has “explained ‘that it is a precept of justice that punishment for 
crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense.’”70 Because 
capital punishment is the harshest legal sanction in the American criminal 
justice system, it is limited to “a narrow category of the most serious 
crimes.”71 The death penalty is considered an excessive infliction of pain 
and suffering and is unconstitutional unless justified by an important social 
purpose.72  
The two main theories of justification for capital punishment are 
deterrence and retribution.73 According to retribution theory, capital 
punishment is justified because the criminal deserves it.74 Likewise, a 
person who does not deserve capital punishment should not receive the 
                                                                                                                 
 66. Id. at 1990; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.  
 67. Welsh, supra note 1, at 273 (arguing that “[i]nternational standards” promote ending 
the death penalty for the intellectually disabled). 
 68. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311.  
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910)). 
 71. Id. at 319. 
 72. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982) (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 
584, 592 (1977)). 
 73. Christopher Adams Thorn, Retribution Exclusive of Deterrence: An Insufficient 
Justification for Capital Punishment, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 199, 200 (1983). 
 74. Id. at 201. 
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death penalty.75 In contrast to retribution, deterrence theory is based on 
utilitarian principles, and it focuses on the benefits to society that occur as a 
result of discouraging other potential offenders from committing capital 
offenses.76 “More particularly, the deterrence theory proposes that 
‘increases in the severity of penalties or the certainty of their imposition on 
offenders who are detected will reduce crime by those who are not directly 
sanctioned.’”77 While deterrence theory is forward looking in that it only 
demands punishment for a crime if punishment would likely deter others 
from committing that crime in the future, retribution theory is retrospective 
in that it punishes a convicted offender because he had committed a crime.78  
Capital punishment of the intellectually disabled cannot be justified 
under retribution theory in light of the diminished culpability of an 
intellectually disabled offender.79 Under retribution theory, the severity of 
punishment for a crime depends on the offender’s culpability.80 The death 
penalty is reserved for only the most serious crimes committed with “a 
consciousness materially more ‘depraved’ than that of any person guilty of 
murder.”81 Even the culpability of an average murderer does not warrant the 
death penalty.82 The Atkins Court found that intellectually disabled 
individuals lack sufficient ability to reason, process information, control 
impulses, or act pursuant to premeditation.83 It logically follows, therefore, 
that intellectually disabled offenders are less capable of understanding their 
crimes.84 Such deficiencies reduce an intellectually disabled person’s 
culpability for committing a crime.85  
Notwithstanding mental impairments, intellectually disabled individuals 
may be convicted for serious crimes such as murder but still lack the 
                                                                                                                 
 75. See id. at 206. 
 76. See id. at 200-01. 
 77. Id. at 200 (quoting PANEL ON RES. ON DETERRENT & INCAPACITATIVE EFFECT, 
DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON 
CRIME RATES 19 (1978)). 
 78. Id. at 201. 
 79. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002). 
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. (quoting Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980)). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 318. 
 84. Lise E. Rahdert, Hall v. Florida and Ending the Death Penalty for Severely Mentally 
Ill Defendants, 124 YALE L.J. F. 34, 34-35 (2014), http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/hall-v-
florida-and-ending-the-death-penalty-for-severely-mentally-ill-defendants. 
 85. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318. 
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culpability necessary to receive the death penalty.86 The culpability of an 
average, nondisabled murderer does not justify capital punishment, and 
mental deficiencies prevent an intellectually disabled murderer’s culpability 
from rising even to that average level.87 Execution of an intellectually 
disabled individual, therefore, does not advance the goals of retribution 
because an intellectually disabled offender’s culpability does not rise to the 
severity of that of the most depraved criminals.88  
Executing an intellectually disabled offender also does not increase 
deterrence because there is likely no premeditation or morally culpable, 
deliberate behavior to deter.89 Moreover, intellectually disabled defendants 
are not likely to comprehend the risk of a capital sentence for committing a 
crime and thus cannot be deterred by the threat of receiving the death 
penalty.90 Capital punishment of the intellectually disabled, therefore, does 
not further the goals of either retribution or deterrence theory.91 
The totality-of-the-evidence test is the best method for reducing the risk 
that intellectually disabled offenders will face excessive and unjustified 
criminal punishment. The Hall Court’s holding was based on the concern 
that Florida’s procedure for determining whether a defendant has an 
intellectual disability “creates an unacceptable risk that persons with 
intellectual disability will be executed . . . .”92 Thus, as Florida has 
demonstrated, giving states broad discretion to establish their own 
procedures for determining a defendant’s intellectual capacity in a capital 
case does not always provide sufficient protection for the intellectually 
disabled. Likewise, the method of using an IQ test score—even with the 
SEM included—creates the risk that an intellectually disabled person will 
be subject to capital punishment because a person may be intellectually 
disabled despite scoring above seventy on an IQ test.93 In contrast, the 
totality-of-the-evidence test would reduce such risk by making an IQ test 
score only one of several factors used to determine intellectual capacity. 
The test accounts for the complexity of intellectual disability by placing 
equal emphasis on evidence of adaptive functioning (the ability to function 
                                                                                                                 
 86. Id. at 319.  
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 320. 
 91. Rahdert, supra note 84, at 35. 
 92. Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1990 (2014). 
 93. See id. at 1995.  
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in society) and intellectual functioning so that no single factor is 
determinative of the existence of intellectual disability.  
B. The Totality-of-the-Evidence Test Allows for Consideration of Other 
Important Factors Along with IQ Test Scores in Determining Intellectual 
Disability 
The clinical definitions of intellectual disability require evaluation of 
proof beyond an IQ score alone to determine whether an individual is 
intellectually disabled.94 The most common definition of intellectual 
disability combines the factors emphasized by the APA and the AAIDD 
into a three-prong test: (1) deficits in intellectual functioning; (2) deficits in 
adaptive functioning; and (3) onset during the developmental period.95 
Because an IQ score only indicates deficits in intellectual functioning,96 
other evidence should be considered to account for the other two prongs.  
1. Deficits in Intellectual Functioning  
The Florida statute struck down in Hall is problematic not for its 
definition of intellectual disability but for its application of the three-prong 
test.97 The first prong of the clinical test for intellectual disability is used 
consistently among the states, but the method of applying it varies. Both the 
AAMR98 and the APA agree that people with intellectual deficits or 
subaverage intellectual functioning receive scores of approximately two 
standard deviations below the mean on standardized intelligence tests, 
including the SEM.99 Measuring an individual’s intelligence through IQ 
tests is the most common way to evaluate intellectual functioning;100 
however, there are many flaws in IQ testing that render it inadequate as the 
sole basis for determining whether a defendant is eligible for capital 
punishment.101  
IQ testing is not precise.102 The margin of error is meant to account for 
testing variability in relation to factors such as the type of test, the particular 
                                                                                                                 
 94. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 27, at 33. 
 95. Usman, supra note 26, at 878. 
 96. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 27, at 33.  
 97. Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 2007-10. 
 98. 93 AM. JUR. Trials § 8 (2004). The AMMR tenth edition was in use prior to the 
name change to AAIDD. 
 99. Id.; AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 27, at 37. 
 100. White, supra note 23, at 692. 
 101. See, e.g., Usman, supra note 26.   
 102. Id. at 896.   
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examiner, and the interpretation of the test results.103 Moreover, “Cultural 
and linguistic diversity needs to be taken into consideration, plus 
differences in sensory, motor, and communication factors.”104 For example, 
individuals who do not speak English as a first language may be at a 
disadvantage in IQ testing because the tests are written in English and 
contain content reflecting “white, middle-class culture” with which 
minority defendants may not be familiar.105 Even the type of test and time 
of day the test is administered can significantly affect an individual’s 
score.106 The danger in imposing a fixed IQ cutoff is that these factors—
which can have a significant effect on the test-taker’s results—are not 
considered.107 Ultimately, “While some states have heeded the scientific 
community’s clear precautions and avoided fixed IQ cutoffs, far too many 
have not.”108  
Although the Supreme Court in Hall properly reversed the Florida 
Supreme Court, it did not go far enough to protect the Eighth Amendment 
rights of the intellectually disabled. Because the Hall Court’s holding was 
limited to the state court’s failure to account for the margin of error in IQ 
testing, Hall would still allow courts to consider IQ testing conclusive 
evidence of intellectual ability so long as they account for the margin of 
error. The Court did not declare unconstitutional a requirement that an IQ 
score be within the margin of error before a defendant can present further 
evidence of intellectual disability. The first prong of the clinical three-prong 
test, therefore, must be satisfied before a defendant can present evidence to 
meet the second and third prongs. Because a particular IQ score, even 
considering the margin of error, fails to account for the other two prongs of 
the clinical test, the Court should have rejected IQ scores as conclusive 
evidence of intellectual ability. 
Under the totality-of-the-evidence test, IQ scores would not, by 
themselves, be conclusive. Rather, defendants claiming intellectual 
disability would be allowed to present evidence to support each of the three 
prongs of the clinical intellectual-disability test simultaneously, and courts 
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would then weigh all of the evidence—regardless of the outcome of an IQ 
test. Unlike Florida’s application of the clinical three-prong test, a 
defendant would not be forced to meet the first prong by producing a 
certain IQ score before being allowed to present evidence for the other two 
prongs. Courts could, therefore, assign equal weight to the adaptive-
functioning prong instead of only considering the intellectual-deficit prong. 
This test would provide for a more accurate and comprehensive review of a 
defendant’s intelligence level and his ability to function in mainstream 
society. 
2. Deficits in Adaptive Functioning 
IQ test scores are relevant for analyzing the first prong of the 
intellectual-disability test but “may be insufficient to assess reasoning in 
real-life situations and mastery of practical tasks.”109 Adaptive functioning 
relates to a person’s ability to function in everyday life.110 The APA defines 
adaptive functioning as “how well a person meets community standards of 
personal independence and social responsibility, in comparison to others of 
similar age and sociocultural background.”111 This prong requires analysis 
of adaptive reasoning in conceptual, social, and practical domains.112 
According to the DSM-5, a person is deficient in adaptive functioning when 
at least one domain “is sufficiently impaired that ongoing support is needed 
in order for the person to perform adequately in one or more life settings at 
school, at work, at home, or in the community.”113 Due to the variety and 
complexity of relevant factors, test scores are insufficient indicia of 
adaptive functioning.114 Rather, evidence from informants close to the 
defendant and evaluations from mental health professionals are necessary to 
assess adaptive functioning.115 
A thorough investigation into adaptive functioning is critical to 
determine whether a person is intellectually disabled. “People with mental 
retardation are complex human beings who likely have certain gifts as well 
as limitations.”116 A person who performs above the cutoff score on an IQ 
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test—which may be imprecise to begin with—may still be intellectually 
disabled due to inability to function independently in the community.117 
Additionally, the DSM-5 determines the severity of intellectual disability 
based on adaptive functioning rather than IQ score.118 Courts, therefore, 
cannot accurately determine how severely a defendant is intellectually 
impaired without reviewing evidence of adaptive functioning.  
The Hall Court recognized the significance of these other factors when 
determining intellectual disability. In dicta, the Court noted that Florida’s 
IQ cutoff prevents defendants from introducing “substantial and weighty 
evidence” of adaptive functioning.119 “This is so even though the medical 
community accepts that all of this evidence can be probative of intellectual 
disability, including for individuals who have an IQ test score above 70.”120 
Recognition of adaptive functioning’s importance suggests the Court’s 
acceptance of the clinical framework for evaluating intellectual disability 
and, perhaps, alludes to its willingness to impose a more comprehensive 
test on all lower courts in the future.121 Applying such a test in Hall, for 
example, would have allowed for evidence of adaptive functioning 
including clinical assessments as well as testimony from teachers, family 
members, and Hall’s attorney—all of which would have been highly 
probative of intellectual ability, regardless of his IQ scores. If the Florida 
Supreme Court had considered this evidence on equal footing with evidence 
of Hall’s intellectual functioning, it may have found him intellectually 
disabled.  
3. Onset During the Developmental Period  
The clinical definitions of intellectual disability require that the deficits 
in intellectual and adaptive functioning begin before a certain age.122 Both 
the AAIDD and the APA require onset before the age of eighteen.123 
Though not mentioned in Atkins, the American Psychological Association 
offers a similar definition of intellectual disability, except that it extends the 
required onset period to age twenty-two.124 This third prong was not an 
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issue in Hall because the Court primarily focused on determining the 
process for meeting the first prong of the intellectual-disability test.125 
Under the totality-of-the-evidence test, however, the age of onset would 
be considered along with the other two prongs. Because the AAIDD and the 
APA require onset before age eighteen,126 the required age for onset under 
the totality-of-the-evidence test could appropriately be set at eighteen. Hall 
likely could have satisfied this prong under the totality-of-the-evidence test 
because he produced school records indicating his intellectual disability and 
testimony from his siblings regarding signs of intellectual disability during 
his youth.127 
The age of onset prong is significant because it is one factor for 
distinguishing between intellectual disability and mental illness.128 Hall 
does not address capital punishment of the mentally ill. Unlike the 
intellectually disabled, mentally ill defendants are not immune from capital 
punishment under the Eighth Amendment.129 This Note does not address 
what would happen in the case of a defendant who developed a mental 
disability after the developmental period. 
C. The Totality-of-the-Evidence Test Is Consistent with Principles of 
Federalism 
Federalism is a principle in American government focused on 
maintaining balance between federal and state authority.130 The Tenth 
Amendment reserves for the states powers that are not delegated by the 
Constitution to the federal government.131 States retain the authority to 
administer criminal justice within their borders.132 Federalism is relevant in 
the context of capital punishment of the intellectually disabled because the 
federal government is regulating an area of law traditionally reserved to the 
states.  
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1. The Totality-of-the-Evidence Test Would Set a New Minimum Level of 
Protection for Defendants Seeking Mitigation of a Capital Sentence Due 
to Intellectual Disability 
Although it may appear from decisions such as Atkins and Hall that the 
federal government has intruded upon the right of the states to administer 
criminal justice, the Supreme Court has merely set constitutional 
boundaries within which the states must operate in order to comply with 
due process. “The protections in the Federal Constitution provide a 
constitutional floor such that the Federal Constitution establishes a 
minimum level of protection to citizens of all states . . . .”133 Thus, states 
may provide more protection to citizens than required by the Constitution, 
but not less.134 
The Hall Court provided guidance to states on where the constitutional 
floor lies for capital punishment of the intellectually disabled by declaring 
that Florida’s fixed IQ requirement fell below the floor.135 The Court did 
not, however, set forth a bright-line rule; rather, it left with the states the 
authority to continue regulating this issue, provided state protection for the 
intellectually disabled does not fall below the new floor set in Hall.136 
Requiring states to implement the totality-of-the-evidence test would 
raise the constitutional floor above the level set in Hall. Under the totality-
of-the-evidence test, accepting an IQ score, even including the margin of 
error, as conclusive evidence of intellectual ability would fall below the 
constitutional floor. States would thus retain the authority to enact their own 
working definitions of intellectual disability and to craft procedures for 
determining which defendants are intellectually disabled as long as 
defendants were afforded the minimum protection of courts considering all 
of the available evidence.  
2. Hall’s Potential Impact on Oklahoma  
Hall may invalidate state statutes that require a fixed IQ score as a 
prerequisite to an intellectual-disability defense. Oklahoma’s relevant 
statute expressly prevents a criminal defendant who scores a seventy-six or 
above on an IQ test from being considered intellectually disabled.137 In 
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theory, therefore, Hall casts doubt upon the constitutionality of Oklahoma’s 
treatment of capital defendants asserting an intellectual-disability defense. 
In practice, however, Hall has provided little help to defendants asserting 
an intellectual-disability defense in state courts.138 Several state and federal 
courts have refused to apply Hall in capital cases by distinguishing it on the 
grounds that their state has not formally adopted a strict IQ cutoff 
requirement or that the jury was instructed on the SEM.139 Because 
Oklahoma’s IQ threshold is six points higher than the seventy-point cutoff 
in Hall, Oklahoma courts may succeed in distinguishing Oklahoma’s statute 
from the Florida statute rejected in Hall. Even if Oklahoma’s statute is 
deemed constitutional under Hall, the statute would not satisfy the totality-
of-the-evidence test because Oklahoma assigns too much weight to IQ test 
scores in determining intellectual ability.  
a) Oklahoma’s Statute on Execution of the Intellectually Disabled Could 
Be Invalidated After Hall 
The Oklahoma statute governing execution of the intellectually disabled, 
title 21, section 701.10b, is outdated. Oklahoma still uses the term 
“mentally retarded” rather than the modern medical term “intellectually 
disabled.”140 Under Oklahoma law, “‘Mental retardation’ or ‘mentally 
retarded’ means significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning, 
existing concurrently with significant limitations in adaptive 
functioning.”141 In several respects, the statute also resembles the Florida 
statute found to be unconstitutional in Hall. Oklahoma law states: 
An intelligence quotient of seventy (70) or below on an 
individually administered, scientifically recognized standardized 
intelligence quotient test administered by a licensed psychiatrist 
or psychologist is evidence of significantly subaverage general 
intellectual functioning; however, it is not sufficient without 
evidence of significant limitations in adaptive functioning and 
without evidence of manifestation before the age of eighteen 
(18) years. In determining the intelligence quotient, the standard 
measurement of error for the test administrated shall be taken 
into account. However, in no event shall a defendant who has 
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received an intelligence quotient of seventy-six (76) or above . . . 
be considered mentally retarded . . . .142 
From a textual standpoint, the statute contains provisions that comport 
with Hall as well as portions that could be rendered unconstitutional. The 
statute bars any defendant scoring a seventy-six or above on an IQ test from 
being considered intellectually disabled.143 The seventy-six-point IQ 
threshold acts as the same barrier to asserting an intellectual-disability 
defense as the seventy-point cutoff in Hall. Unlike in Hall, however, the 
Oklahoma statute expressly requires other factors beyond a mere IQ test 
score to be considered.144 The Oklahoma statute also explicitly requires 
courts to account for the SEM of IQ testing.145 Although the statute may 
appear constitutional on its face, judicial interpretation can render it 
unconstitutional in practice if courts require a fixed IQ score before a 
defendant may present other evidence, as the Florida Supreme Court did in 
Hall.146 An examination of Oklahoma case law is necessary to determine 
whether the Oklahoma statute, as applied to specific cases, violates the 
Eighth Amendment under Hall.  
In Murphy v. State, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals applied 
Atkins to establish a definition for intellectually disabled.147 According to 
Murphy, a defendant is considered intellectually disabled upon a showing 
of three factors: (1) subaverage intellectual functioning; (2) that is 
manifested before age eighteen; and (3) significant limitations in adaptive 
functioning in at least two out of a list of specified skill areas.148 
Furthermore, the defendant bears the burden of proving intellectual 
disability by a preponderance of the evidence, and at least one IQ test score 
of seventy or below is required as evidence before proceeding with an 
intellectual-disability defense.149 
The court of criminal appeals elaborated on the test for determining 
intellectual disability in Blonner v. State.150 The Blonner court overruled 
Murphy and established new procedures for Atkins hearings, which are held 
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to determine whether a defendant is intellectually disabled.151 The court, 
however, affirmed much of the working definition of intellectually disabled 
set forth in Murphy.152 Under Blonner, a defendant claiming an exemption 
from capital punishment due to an intellectual disability must still produce 
an IQ test score of seventy or below, but courts must account for the margin 
of error in IQ testing.153 Supposing a five-point margin of error, an IQ score 
of seventy-five or below would fall within the range showing intellectual 
disability; but a defendant who scores higher than seventy-five on an IQ test 
is barred from introducing further evidence of intellectual disability by the 
seventy-six-point cutoff.154 
In sum, the court interpreted the intellectual disability statute to impose 
the same IQ requirement of seventy or lower as the Florida statute in Hall 
but with consideration of the margin of error.155 Oklahoma’s inclusion of 
the SEM may prevent Hall from invalidating the statute, or Hall may render 
the statute unconstitutional due to the explicit seventy-six-point threshold. 
While Hall’s precise effect has yet to be determined, what is clear is that the 
Oklahoma judiciary’s interpretation of the statute—characterized by a 
disproportionate focus on IQ scores—fails the totality-of-the-evidence test. 
b) Oklahoma Assigns Too Much Weight to IQ Test Scores in Capital 
Cases 
Oklahoma courts have held that IQ tests are determinative evidence that 
a defendant is not intellectually disabled.156 Post-Blonner, the Murphy 
defendant’s intellectual-disability claim was set for retrial and finally 
decided in 2012.157 Because Murphy submitted IQ test scores above 
seventy-six, he failed to meet the statutory requirement for intellectual 
disability.158 Murphy then challenged the constitutionality of the statutory 
bar to an intellectual-disability defense to capital murder based on a single 
IQ test score of seventy-six or above.159 He argued that the seventy-six-
point cutoff is an arbitrary restriction on pursuing an intellectual-disability 
defense.160 The court showed deference to the state legislature and 
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presumed the statute was constitutional.161 Thus, the court upheld the 
statute, finding that the seventy-six-point limit was consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s rationale in Atkins and did not violate due process.162  
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals again used IQ test scores as 
conclusive evidence in Smith v. State.163 In Smith, the petitioner sought 
post-conviction relief after he was sentenced to death for first-degree 
murder.164 Smith alleged that his sentence was unconstitutional and that he 
should not receive the death penalty because he was intellectually 
disabled.165 To show his mental disability, Smith provided IQ test scores of 
seventy-six, seventy-nine, and seventy-one, along with reports from a 
psychiatrist and two psychologists.166 Smith contended that his scores met 
the statutory requirement for intellectual disability because they fell within 
the relevant range when the margin of error is considered.167 The court, 
however, interpreted Oklahoma law to mean that, although the law requires 
that “an I.Q. score near the cutoff of 70 be treated as a range bounded by 
the limits of error, it also directs unequivocally that no such treatment be 
afforded to scores of 76 or above,” in accordance with section 701.10b.168 
Because Smith provided scores of seventy-six and seventy-nine, the margin 
of error was not considered, and the scores were considered conclusive 
evidence that he was not intellectually disabled.169 This consideration of IQ 
test scores as conclusive evidence of intellectual capacity violates the 
totality-of-the-evidence test because it excludes evidence of adaptive 
functioning and the age of onset. 
The future of Oklahoma law governing capital punishment of the 
intellectually disabled remains uncertain. Courts may find Oklahoma’s 
statute constitutional under Hall because the statute requires inclusion of 
the SEM. The Smith court, however, interpreted the statute to impose a 
strict cutoff IQ score of seventy-six.170 The court refused to consider the 
SEM or review further evidence because the defendant produced an IQ 
score of seventy-six.171 Thus, the court essentially imposed an outright bar 
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to a defendant’s ability to offer evidence of deficits in adaptive functioning 
and age of onset if he scored a seventy-six or higher on an IQ test.172 
Oklahoma courts, therefore, only consider the SEM for IQ scores below 
seventy-six.173 This selective inclusion of the SEM is exactly the type of 
inconsistent state procedure that puts intellectually disabled defendants at 
risk of capital punishment. Oklahoma law thus serves as a prime example 
of the need for a uniform test to ensure courts consider all of the evidence 
of a defendant’s intellectual ability as opposed to a single number. 
V. Conclusion 
The Hall Court expanded Eighth Amendment protection for 
intellectually disabled defendants, but further safeguards are necessary. 
While the Court reduced the scope of states’ authority to establish 
procedures for determining a capital defendant’s intellectual capacity, it still 
did not set forth a bright-line test for determining intellectual disability. To 
avoid risking the lives of intellectually disabled defendants through 
inconsistent state procedures, the totality-of-the-evidence test should be 
imposed. The test would offer increased protection by allowing defendants 
to present all evidence of intellectual disability. An IQ test score—by 
itself—would no longer be determinative. The totality-of-the-evidence test 
provides a holistic view of a defendant’s intellectual capacity and helps 
prevent the unconstitutional punishment of those lacking the requisite 
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